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CHAPTER I 
ll\fTRODUCTION 
Descartes proposes in his Regulae a theory of sim-
ple natures (naturae simplices) as the most basic elements 
of all knm·lledge. Certain knowledge is possible only be-
cause of the clear and distinct intuition of these natures. 
He further claims that all knowledge consists in various 
combinations of these natures. 
Though the full title of the Regulae (Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind) indicates that Descartes' intention 
was to provide some principles for an efficient and reliable 
method of inquiry, some commentators claim that the method 
presupposes at least a rudimentary epistemology. The pre-
cise nature of this epistemology is still a matter of dis-
pute. A prime focus of this dispute is the doctrine of 
simple natures •. One group claims that these simple natures 
are ideas, and not themselves part of an extra-mental world. 
\.Jitness, for example, the claim of LeBlond: ". • .1' inven-
I ~ taire des natures simples est presente, non comme un examen 
des choses, mais seulement des idees •• • • If the simple 
natures are, in fact, ideas, and if 1.ve take seriously the 
1Jean LeBlond, "Les natures simples chez Descartes," 
Archives de Philosophie, XIII (1937), p. 172. 
1 
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claim that all knmvledge is compounded out of these ideas, 
then ive must conclude that the Regulae espouses an epistem-
ological position best characterized as representationalism. 
This claim about the nature of the epistemology has, 
however, been disputed by other scholars, \vho insist upon 
a realist interpretation. Consider, for example, Keeling's 
position: 
Ce r~alisme ne rlside pas dans le fait que les 
existences sont toujours vis~es par nos id~es 
et nos jugements, mais dans le fait que la rlal-
ite existante est apprJhend~e directement, sans 
l'intervention ni l'aide d'une idle ou d'un jugement.2 
To characterize the epistemology of the Regulae as a real-
ism is to claim that to knmv the simple natures is to knmv 
the extra-mental "world directly. Thus, the simple natures 
are considered to be themselves extra-mentally real. 
The competing interpretations of the epistemology 
of the Regulae depend, in the end, upon fundamentally dif-
ferent interpretations of the .doctrine of simple natures. 
Are these simple natures ideas or are they extra-mental 
existents? If. the former is correct, then the epistemology 
of the Regulae is representationalism; if the latter, then 
it is direct realism. The purpose of the thesis is to 
assess the evidence for each of the two interpretations 
concerning the status of the simple natures. 
The representational interpretation is initially 
2s. v. Keeling, "Le re'alisme de Descartes et le r~le des natures simples," Revue de l1etaphysique et T1orale 
44 (1937), p. 70. 
3 
attractive, for under it the Regulae appear to foreshadow 
the later philosophy, vlhich Descartes openly declared to 
be representational.3 Those who see the Regulae as espous-
ing realism claim, though, that this same realism is pres-
ent in the later philosophy. 4 Thus, each of the interpre-
tations claims the continuity of the Cartesian doctrine as 
support. It seems useful, therefore, to conduct a careful 
study of the internal evidence of the Regulae in order to 
avoid reading into it a doctrine he may not have held at 
that time. 
To call the one interpretation a theory of ttrepre-
sentative" ideas can be sommvhat misleading, for traditional 
(e.g., the Lockean) representative theories have been doc-
trines about sensa or sensory images that somehmv picture 
to the mind what is extramental. If the simple natures of 
Descartes are to be called representative, it cannot be in 
this way. First, Descartes did not consider such mental 
3see th.e letter to Gibieuf, January 19, 1642: "I 
am certain that I can have no knmvledge of 1rlhat is outside 
me except by means of the ideas I have within me; and so I 
take great care not to relate my judgments immediately to 
things in the vwrld ••• 11 In this and all future citations 
from the correspondence I employ the translation of Anthony 
Kenny in Descartes: Philosophical Letters (London: Claren-
don Press, 19?0). 
4Keeling, pp. 65-66. See also Brian O'Neil, "Car-
tesian Simple Natures~" Journal of the History of Philos-
ophy, 10 (April, 1972;. O'Neil's recently published book, 
E istemolo ical Direct Realism in Descartes' Philoso ~ 
"(Albuquerque: University of New Hexico Press, 1975 was 
received too late for consideration in this Hork. 
4 
images themselves knowledge.5 Second, many of the simple 
natures could not be representative in this way. The na-
tures of the first group (thought, doubt, will, etc.) can-
not be the subject of mental pictures; they refer to nothing 
physical and therefore to nothing picturable. Some of the 
common notions of the third group present similar difficul-
ties, for in this group Descartes includes principles of 
inference and various necessary relations. He claims also 
that the negations of all the simple natures are themselves 
simple natures. None of these could be pictures. If the 
Cartesian simple natures are representative, it cannot be 
because they provide a sensible picture or copy of extra-
mental reality. 
A somewhat different notion of representation is 
required. First, the doctrine must accomodate all those 
things that Descartes regards as simple natures. This is 
best accomplished by regarding the natures as basic units 
of intelligibility (intelligibilia) rather than sensa. 
This successfully takes into account also his claim that 
mental images are not themselves knowledge. 
Second, our understanding of representation must 
preserve the essential claim that we do not know extra-
mental reality directly, but only through the mediation of 
ideas. Thus, the claim of representationalism is that what 
5This will be shown in Chapter 3, in the discussion 
of the objectivity of the simple natures. 
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we know directly are our own ideas. Further, it claims 
that in knowing our ideas, we have reason to believe that 
we knov.; what extra-mental reality must be like. The diffi-
culty for such an epistenology is to establish good reasons 
for such confidence, without the petitio of appealing to 
some extra-mental existent as guaranteeing the correla-
tion. 6 There is_, then, a negative aspect to the represen-
tational claim: it-le do not knov1 extra-mental reality direct-
ly. What we do knm.,r are our 0\'ln ideas. According to the 
Regulae the most basic ideas are the simple natures, and 
all other ideas are compounded from them. 
The realist position holds that what is known dir-
ectly is extra-mental reality. It claims that the intelli-
gible structure of the object and the intelligible struc-
ture as present to the mind are numerically one. It would 
reject the contention that our ideas represent reality, 
because such a contention \vould deny the immediacy of the 
knower's contact with the world. Note that both positions 
would claim that the knm.,rer is in immediate contact with the 
known; they differ on what it is that is most immediately 
known. Under a realist interpretation the exclusively men-
tal character of the simple natures would be denied; and 
their importance in knowledge would be attributed to the 
6 rn the f1editations Descartes attempts to establish 
this correlation of mind to lrlorld by establishing the di-
vine guarantee. This is not a petitio if he can establish 
the necessity of the existence of this divine guarantee by 
appealing only to ideas. 
6 
claim that they ~ the extra-mental Horld, insofar as it 
is intelligible. 
I shall examine what I take to be the most forceful 
arguments for each interpretation. The arguments for the 
realist interpretations will be for the most part, those of 
Keeling and O'Neil. The representational interpretation 
presents some difficulties in this regard. It is the re-
ceived doctrine and has been largely accepted by Cartesian 
scholars without criticism. There is, therefore, a paucity 
of careful argumentation in support of it. I will take it 
upon myself to formulate the strongest arguments and most 
explicit textual support for this position. 
I shall, in the end, be forced to conclude that the 
textual evidence of the Regulae does not yield a definitive 
case for either interpretation. I believe that the incon-
clusiveness is Descartes' mvn; he had not yet developed a 
well thought out, consistent epistemology. Because the 
Regulae is prim~rily a work on method, it is not surprising 
that no doctrine about the relation of knmvledge to its 
objects can be found there. The problems of error and un-
certainty 'tvould eventually lead Descartes to a theory of 
mind and so to a more explicit doctrine of representative 
ideas; but, by that time, he had begun to neglect the doc-
trine of simplicity, and the representative ideas of the 
later philosophy are for the most part complex rather than 
simple. 
-CHAPTER II 
THE GENERAL DOCTRTI~E 
The doctrine of simple natures is an early theory 
of Descartes and receives scant attention in what are re-
garded as his more definitive philosophical works. There-
fore, I do not wish to presume in the reader more than a 
general acquaintance with the doctrine. Accordingly, this 
chapter provides a more detailed account of that doctrine. 
I do not here enter into the area of dispute outlined in 
the introduction; my intention is, instead, to establish 
what seems indisputably true about the doctrine. This 
will provide the context within which the controversy 
about the ontological status of the simple natures must be 
resolved, if it is resolvable. The chapter will consider 
three topics: the nature of the method, the role of the 
simple natures in the method, and the three groups of sim-
ple natures. 
The Nature of the Hethod 
A superficial reading of the Regulae might give 
birth to the assumption that method, in its two-fold pro-
cedure of analysis and synthesis, is a post facto artifi-
cial device for testing and re-verifying what we already 
know. Such an assumption \vould be 'tvrongheaded for t'\..YO 
7 
8 
reasons. First, Descartes views his method as being in no 
way an artificial device used to supplement the natural 
procedures of the mind. The method is itself the mind's 
natural \·Jay of proceeding in the acquisition of knowledge. 
Rule IV states repeatedly Descartes' claim that the culti-
vation of method is the cultivation of reasoning itself, of 
our mvn innate capacities for arriving at certain truth. 1 
Analysis and synthesis are, therefore, not a quality-con-
trol device imposed upon knowledge ab exteriore, but the 
natural procedure of knmvledge itself. The simple natures, 
as end-points of analysis, must therefore belong to the 
natural procedure of knowing. 
Second (and this follows readily from the first 
point), the method does not have as its goal the re-verifi-
cation of 'ivhat we already knmv. It is only through the 
method that we achieve that insight or mental vision that 
1
"Such a science [the I·1athesis Universal is] should 
contain the urimary rudiments of human reason ••• " (AT X, 
Rule IV, 374?-9). In Rule V he claims that in the proposed 
method "lies the sum of all human endeavor." (AT X, Rule V, 
37922-23) 
Given this, it is not surprising that in the Dis-
course the cultivation of method has taken on an ethical 
import: 
I felt it incumbent on me to make a review of the 
various occupations of men in this life in order 
to try to seek out the best. • • I thought that I 
could do no better than to continue in ••• culti-
vating my Reason, and in advancing myself as much 
as possible in the knowledge of the truth in accord-
ance vli th the method 'ivhich I had prescribed myself. 
This and all future citations from the Regulae, 
Discourse, Meditations, and Principles are taken ~rom the 
naidane-~oss translation. Any significant departures from 
their text will be noted. 
• 
9 
2 becomes knowledge. This seems initially a rather puzzling 
position, for what we usually regard as knowledge are the 
individual "facts" that we learn about the world through the 
senses. Descartes would be unhappy with such a characteri-
zation of knowledge. Real knowledge, he believes, is sci-
entia, an ordered system of certain truths. He declares 
--
that certainty i$ not to be found in isolated bits of data, 
but in some system in which the interconnection of all know-
ledge becomes obvious: 
If, therefore, anyone vlishes to search out the 
truth of things in serious earnest, he ought not 
to select any apecial science, for all the scien-
ces are conjoined with each other and interdependent ••• 3 
Though he does not disparage the use of the senses, 
he refuses to characterize sense experience as knowledge. 
It cannot provide the interconnectedness that is the mark 
of true knowledge or scientia. The testimony of the senses 
"fluctuates,"4 and generalizations made from such testimony 
are "frequently fallacious."5 The only true sources of 
knowledge are i~tuition and deduction. 6 Intuition and de-
duction are certain only because analysis and synthesis 
afford us insight into the simplest and indubitable ele-
ments of knowledge and the ways in \vhich they may be 
2AT X, Rule v, 37915-17. 
3AT X, Rule I, 36114-18. 
4AT X, Rule III, 36814 , 
5AT X, Rule II, 3654-5 ~ 
6AT X, Rule III, 3689-l4 • 
10 
combined. Various areas of knowledge are interconnected 
because they are all constructed from these simple natures. 
Since this thesis is concerned with the theory of 
knowledge in the Regulae, it must concentrate on those sim-
ple natures and their role in knm'lledge. Though sense data 
may sometimes stimulate or at least occasion the knowing 
process, the essential characteristics of the early Cartes-
ian theory of knmvledge can be discovered only by discover-
ing the nature of that which is revealed in analysis and 
combined in synthesis. 
II 
• • • 
The Role of the Sim;ele Natures in the l1ethod 
Analysis is that mental activity by vlhich tole 
reduce involved and obscure propositions step by 
step to those that are simpler."? This is done to gain an 
understanding of \..;hat is involved in the concept or propo-
sition examined and h01:1 its various aspects8 are related. 
Our use of analysis is most often pragmatic. On such occa-
sions, we cease dividing the issue v.rhen vre have brought the 
problem \vithin manageable limits for the purpose at hand. 
Further analysis is often possible, but we may have no 
7AT X, Rule V, 379l7-l9. 
8 r employ such vague terminology at this point in 
order to avoid a premature conmitment to some interpreta-
tion of the ontological status of the basic elements out of 
which knowledge is constructed. In fact, the thesis exam-
ines the case for a more definitive interpretation of these 
elements and concludes that the vagueness is Descartes' own 
and cannot be resolved in the Regulae. 
... 
11 
immediate use for it. Descartes calls the end-point of 
analysis the "absolute."9 In this case it is the relative-
ly absolute (relative to the purpose at hand). 
On the other hand, it is possible, Descartes be-
lieves, to push analysis beyond the point at 1r1hich our pres-
ent purposes will be satisfied. Ultimately, we \vill arrive 
at the most basic elements of knowledge, those that are no 
longer complex and cannot be further divided by analysis. 
These truly absolute (maxime absoluta) end-points of analy-
sis are the simple natures. We have an intuitive apprehen-
sion of them that guarantees the certainty of our knowledge 
of them. This certainty extends to more complex knm'lledge 
insofar as it is constructed from these simple natures. "vle 
need to determine precisely what this simplicity is and why 
Descartes claims that it provides the foundation for cer-
tainty in knowledge. 
The simplicity of which he speaks is simplicity in 
the order of thought. Any individual existing object is 
in itself simple, but this is different from the order in 
\'lhich \ve consider the nature of the object.10 Thus, al-
though analysis enables us to consider extension separately 
from figure and motion separately from duration, this 
9AT X, Rule VI, 38122-3822 • 
10 
"We assert that relatively to our knowledge sin-
gle things should be taken in an order different from that 
in which we should regard them when considered in their 
more real nature." AT X, Rule XII, 418. 
• 
12 
provides no justification for assuming the possibility of 
their existing independent of each other. 
In the search for simple natures, hmv does one know 
when to stop analyzing? This does not seem at all problem-
atic, for \ve would expect the analysis to stop at the point 
at \vhich it can no longer continue. Nevertheless, this will 
not be an adequate criterion, for it is sometimes possible 
to further abstract from a simple nature. For example, the 
mind can separate the notion of a limit from the notion of 
a figure(because a figure has limits). But limit does not 
qualify as a simple nature, for it cannot function unambig-
uously as a simple element in knowledge. It is parasitic 
and equivocal. Its meaning remains obscure until it is 
linked \vith something like figure, motion, time, pmver, etc.; 
and, in each case, the limit becomes something different 
from what it \vould be in any of the other cases. We have 
no clear notion of limit apart from what is limited; 
• • • consequently it is something compounded out of a num-II 
ber of natures wholly diverse, of which it can be only am-
biguously predicated. n11 
Because the goal of analysis is to acquaint us 
with the simple natures as the most basic elements of cer-
tain knowledge, it would be self-defeating to pursue the 
analysis to the point at which certain knowledge is no 
11AT X, Rule XII, 4193-5. 
... 
13 
longer to be had. Descartes expresses this evidential 
requisite in the following v1ay: "\le shall call only those 
simple the perception of which is so clear and distinct 
that they cannot be divided by the mind into several more 
distinct perceptions.rr12 This stipulation guards against 
the introduction of such notions as limit as simple natures, 
since they do not have the requisite clarity and distinct-
ness. Nothing in knowledge is gained and much is lost by 
pushing the analysis too far. 1 3 Analysis has a point of 
diminished epistemological returns. Simplicity may be de-
fined as the point in analysis at \vhich further analysis 
becomes less clear and distinct; the simplicity is one of 
evidence. 
As can be seen, Descartes is even at this early 
period using some sort of doctrine of clarity and distinct-
ness. There is no further explanation of this in the Regu-
lae, but it is safe to assume that the doctrine is the same 
as that in the later philosophy; for the simple natures of 
the Regulae meet the criteria for clarity and distinctness 
implicit in the Meditations and formulated explicitly in 
12AT X, Rule XII, 41814- 17. To be consistent, Des-
cartes should have said that they cannot be divided into 
several perceptions as distinct. The point of arrest in 
analysis occurs when-aistinctness and clarity begin to lessen. 
l3Throughout his philosophical career, Descartes 
criticized those who attempt to further analyze the simple 
and end up confusing rather than clarifying. See the Regu-
lae, AT X, Rule XII, 4269-13, 42619-21; Search After Truth, 
ATX, 523-524; Principles I, X; Letter to l1ersenne, October 
16, 1639. 
..... 
14 
the Principles. To show this will afford us further in-
sight into the doctrine of simplicity of the Regulae. 
According to the Principles, a clear (clara) idea 
is one that 
• • • is present and apparent to an attentive mind 
in the same way as we assert that we see objects 
clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, 
they operate on it with sufficient strength.l4 
When vision is clear, the object of vision operates on the 
eye with sufficient strength, so that no part of the object 
is ignored; "~:lhen an idea is clear, we attend to all parts 
of it, so that no part is left unthought. Any perception 
of any simple nature must be clear; 
For, if our mind attains the least awareness of 
it • . . , it can be concluded just from this that 
we know it entirely. Other~vise, it could not be 
said to be simple, but composed of that which we 
perceive and of that of 1.1hich we think we are 
ignorant.l5 
The simple natures satisfy the criterion for dis-
tinctness as well: "• •• the distinct is that which is so 
precise and di~ferent from all other objects that it con-
tains within itself nothing but what is clear. 1116 That the 
simple natures meet this criterion may be shown in two ways. 
First, any idea that is perfectly clear must also be dis-
tinct. A perfectly clear perception carries with it a guar-
antee that we perceive that by which the object in question 
14P . . 1 I XLV r1.nc1.p es, , • 
l5AT X, Rule XII, 42025-4212 • 
16Pr· . 1 I XLV 1.nc1.p es, , • 
P· 
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is different from all other objects. 17 The simple natures 
are, we have seen, perceived with perfect clarity, if they 
are perceived at all. They must, then, be perceived dis-
tinctly. Secondly, simplicity itself (even without refer-
ence to clarity) guarantees distinctness. To see this, con-
sider the hypothesis that tvlo simple natures, x and !' are 
not distinct from each other. The hypothesis could be true 
under either of two conditions. First, ! and ! might be 
exactly the same perception. If that is so, then we are 
merely using two names to refer to the same perception; of 
course, there is no question of a perception being distinct 
from itself, so the hypothesis could not be true under the 
first condition. The second condition is that x and z are 
two different perceptions. If that is so, then they could 
be indistinct or confused only if z is a compound of x and 
something else, or vice-versa. In such a case, only one 
would be a simple nature. \ole have shmvn by a reductio that 
the indistinct-perception of a simple nature is an impossi-
bility. 
This perfect clarity and distinctness in our per-
ception of the simple natures guarantees them a special 
epistemic status. When simple natures are known as simple, 
they are known with an apodictic certainty. Descartes says 
that'all these simple natures are knovm per se and never 
9 11 
17Principles, I, XLVI; Resp. ad II Obj., AT VI, 
147 - • S"ee also L. J. Beck, The t1ethod of Descartes 
(London: OXford University Press, 1952), pp. 59-60. 
p 
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contain any falsity. "18 If \ve admit to some knowledge of a 
simple nature as well as to the knowledge that it is sim-
ple, we must also grant that our knoVTledge of it is com-
plete and certain. 
In \vhat could any uncertainty consist? 1.fe have al-
ready seen that \ve cannot maintain consistently both the 
knm>~ledge that it is simple and that ". • • over and above 
what we have present to us or attain to by thi~~ing, there 
is something hidden from us."l9 That would be to claim 
knowledge of only a part of that which has no parts. 
Can our knowledge of a simple nature be falsified 
through a failure to refer to some existent extra-mental 
object? This question presumes a reso~ution to the central 
problem of the thesis: what is the relation of simple na-
tures to the extra-mental world? I will show eventually 
that the problem is not really solvable within the Regulae. 
Descartes himself does not consider this issue because he 
believes that knowledge can proceed without making judg-
ments about the conformity of mind to vlorld, i.e., that 
there can be 'non-existential knowledge.• The simple na-
tures are understood, and as long as \ve understand them 
(without attempting to make existential judgments) we do 
18AT X, Rule XII, 42014- 15. 
l9AT X, Rule XII, 42021- 23. 
17 
not run the risk of falsification. 
But the understanding of a wise man will not be 
deceived ••• , since he 'tvill judge that v1hatever 
comes to him from his imagination is really depicted 
in it, but yet will never assert that the object has 
passed complete and 't-Ii thout alteration from the ex-
ternal \'IOrld to his senses, and from the senses to 
his imagination, unless he has some previous ground 
for believing this.20 
The Three Groups of Simple Natures 
In Rule XII Descartes divides the simple natures 
into three groups: the purely intellectual, the material, 
and those 'tvhich can be ascribed univocally to either the 
intellectual or the material. Almost as an afterthought, 
he includes the negations of the natures of all three 
groups. 
He says that the first group, the intellectual sim-
ple natures, "are knov-m by the intellect through a certain 
inborn light and without the aid of any corporeal imagery."21 
They include thought, knmvledge, doubt, ignorance, voli-
tion, etc. That they are known through a natural light 
does not distinguish the first group from the others, for 
he characterizes all the simple natures as being known or 
intuited through this natural light. When he claims that 
20AT X, Rule XII, 423l3-20• If this, in fact, 
avoids the problem of falsification, it would also seem to 
preclude any characterization of the simple natures as true. 
As I shall shov1 later, Descartes skirts this issue with an 
objectification of the idea. 
21AT X, Rule XII, 4199-ll. 
.. 
18 
the natures are free from falsity, he makes a distinction 
between "· •• that faculty ••• by which it [the under-
standing] has intuitive awareness of things ••• [and] 
t b h . h . t . d rr 22 N f th . 1 tha y w 1c 1 JU ges. • • • one o e Slmp e na-
tures can be doubted, because and as long as we restrict 
ourselves to such an intuitive a\·tareness of them. In Rule 
v, he states in a similar vein that there is an "intuitive 
apprehension of all those that are absolutely simple."23 
And the light metaphor is used to characterize any intuition 
whatsoever: "· •• intuition is the undoubting conception 
of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the 
1 · ht f 1 u24 _!g o reason a one. • • 
The second part of his statement seems to be the 
criterion for distinguishing the first group of natures. 
He claims that the first group are all known "without the 
aid of any corporeal imagery." This should not be surpris-
ing when we recognize that corporeal imagery \"iOUld be use-
less: "• •• it is impossible to construct any corporeal 
idea \"ihich shall represent to us what the act of knmv-ing is, 
what doubt is ••• "25 As it stands, the criterion is only 
negative, but it does have a positive claim to make. The 
22AT X 
' 
Rule XII, 42016- 18 ~ 
23AT X, Rule v, 37919-20. 
24AT X, Rule III, 36818-20. The emphasis is mine. 
25AT X, Rule XII, 41912-15. 
-19 
simple natures of the first group are knowable, but the 
knowledge of them is not at all dependent on corporeal 
imagery. There are actually two criteria here: the first 
concerns the appropriate use of the pmver of knovring (the 
understanding unaided by the imagination); the second con-
cerns the nature of the object of knowledge (that which is 
real but non-corporeal). 
The second group is composed of the material simple 
natures. These, Descartes says, "are discerned only as 
being in bodies."26 To understand this statement, we must 
examine his discussion of necessary relations. He says 
that two natures are united necessarily ". • • when one is 
so implied in the concept of another in a confused sort of 
way that we cannot conceive either distinctly, if our thought 
~ssigns to them separateness from each other."27 The cri-
terion for a necessary relation between natures x and ~ is 
not that we should be unable to intuit x without intuiting 
~· In fact, if that were the criterion, Descartes would 
have great di.ff:iculty expla:ining how ! and ~ could be distinct. 
He wants, instead, to maintain that the criterion for the 
necessary relation between ! and ~ should be the impossi-
bility of intuiting ! clearly and distinctly while stipulat-
ing the absence of ~· As examples of such necessary rela-
tions he offers figure and extension, motion and duration, 
26AT X, Rule XII, 41918-19. 
27AT X, Rule XII, 4215-8 • The emphasis is mine. 
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etc. When he claims that the second group of simple natures 
are discerned only as being in bodies, he is stating the 
necessary relation of these with corporeity or extension. 
This would distinguish them from the natures of the first 
group. 
Further support for this interpretation can be 
gleaned from what he says about the third group of natures, 
those that can belong to either of the first two groups 
without any change of meaning. He says that they are 
"ascribed nou to corporeal things, nm" to spirits, without 
distinction."28 As examples he offers existence, unity, 
and duration. He immediately adds that the common notions, 
because they are members of the third group, "can be dis-
cerned by the understanding either unaided or when it is 
aware of the images of material things."29 This further 
distinction will prove interesting for us because of its 
intimation that the imagination has a role on the percep-
tion of the second and third groups. The role of the imag-
ination could have implications for the ontological status 
of at least these simple natures. We will examine this 
more carefully later. 
Besides the common notions, the third group in-
cludes various necessary relations. These relations func-
tion as "bonds for connecting together the other simple 
28AT X, Rule XII, 41920- 21 • 
29AT X, Rule XII, 41929-4302 • 
21 
natures, and on their evidence depends whatever we con-
clude through reasoning."30 As an example he cites: 
"things that are all the same as a third thing are the same 
as one another."3l He offers a more comprehensive list in 
the Replies to the Second Objections but has reservations 
about which are primary and which are derivative.32 More-
over, that list is restricted to those necessary relations 
employed in arguments for the existence of God and the im-
mortality of the soul. The third group seems to be rather 
mixed; it includes Euclidean axioms and (he claims without 
benefit of examples) all the basic rules of inference,33 as 
well as such natures as existence, unity, and duration. 
We might initially be taken aback at finding what 
seem to be judgments included in a catalogue of simple per-
ceptions of the understanding. After all, Descartes him-
self reminds us of the difference between understanding and 
judgment.34 He does not, though, regard these necessary 
30AT X, Rule XII, 41924- 26• 
3lAT X, Rule XII, 41926- 27. 
32Henri Gouhier has compiled a list of these rela-
tions as they occur throughout the vrorks of Descartes. See 
his La ensee meta h si ue de Descartes (Paris: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, , pp. 1- • 
33smith regards Descartes' claim that these natures 
are bonds of inference as some unfortunate regress to Schol-
astic thinking. See his Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 3?, n. 2. 
34Although this distinction does not appear as 
clearly in the Regulae as it does in the later vrorks, it is 
nonetheless there. He claims that we cannot fall into error 
22 
relations as judgments: for (1) they do not assert any 
extra-mental existence, and (2) they do not affirm the 
inclusion of anything beyond what is clearly and distinct-
ly perceived. It is a feature of his philosophy that the 
truth of at least some propositions can be perceived with-
out any act of judgment. 
Nor are these natures as complex as they might seem. 
They are, Descartes believes, as simple as the other simple 
natures. As expressions of necessary relations among na-
tures, they cannot be reduced to relations that are simpler; 
and as principles of inference they cannot be broken dovm 
into simpler principles. Their sentential form is decep-
tive. It is not the number of words that distinguishes 
simplicity from complexity; it is the non-simplicity of 
the "thought" by which the concept in question is perceived. 
In addition to the presentation of the three groups, 
Descartes includes the negations of and privative terms 
corresponding to the simple natures as themselves simple.35 
This is not surprising. He intends to give an account of 
the fundamentals of all knowledge; some way of dealing with 
with negation must be found. For two reasons it would be 
wrong to claim that the negation of some simple nature x 
is a complex of two natures, x and something like negation, 
as long as we attend only to what we understandi without 
making judgments about it. AT X, Rule XII, 423 5-20. 
35AT X, Rule XII, 4203-5. 
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privation, non-being, etc. First, negation cannot itself 
be a simple nature, for we can never have the requisite 
clear and distinct knov.fledge of it. Negation, like limi-
tation , is parasitic in that it acquires its specific mean-
ing from the character of that which is being negated. 
Second, there is something counter-intuitive about claiming 
that the negation of ~ is something added to x. Descartes 
saw this quite clearly, I am sure, by the time of the Medi-
tations. He argues there that the infinite cannot be a 
negation of the finite, "for, ••• there is manifestly 
more reality in infinite substance than in finite •••• "36 
If Descartes wants to preserve his picture of knowledge as 
being built entirely out of atomic elements, he must regard 
the negation of each of the natures as itself a simple 
nature. 
It seems,then, that Descartes has really attempted 
to group all elements in knowledge within his doctrine of 
simple natures. The natures themselves are a heterogeneous 
lot: they include attributes of mind only, attributes of 
body only, attributes of both, principles of inference, 
axioms of geometry, necessary relations, and negations. 
The mode of cognition varies; some can be perceived by the 
understanding alone, some require imagination, and others 
may be known in either way. This, then, is a general 
36Meditation III. 
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account of the simple natures of the Regulae. The thesis 
will raise the question: are they ideas or are they ele-
ments of extra-mental reality? 
CHAPTER III 
THE S TI·IPLE NA'I'URES AS REPRESENTATIVE IDRt\..8 
This chapter ivill examine the case for interpret-
ing the simple natures as representative ideas. One claim 
(seldom made explicit) is that such an interpretation is 
required in order to make the early doctrine compatible 
with the later doctrine of representative ideas. I shall 
not examine this claim as it would involve us in a detailed 
study of the later philosophy. Moreover, such external evi-
dence is to be admitted only in support of or after despair-
ing of the possibility of internal evidence. I shall re-
strict this chapter, therefore, to the internal evidence 
of the Regulae for the doctrine of representative ideas. 
Such evidence, if present, will indicate that what we know 
most directly are our own ideas. Because Descartes claims 
that what we knm.; directly are the simple natures, this 
sort of evidence \vould enable us to conclude that the sim-
ple natures are ideas rather than extra-mental reality. 
What an argument for the representational interpretation 
must establish, then, is the essentially mental character 
of '\vhat is immediately known. 
The Order of Thought and the Order of Nature 
In Rule VI, Descartes claims that his method 
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differs from that of the Scholastics in that it requires 
us to compare things in the order of their interdependence 
1 in knowledge. His presumption is that the Scholastics 
neglected the order of knov'lledge in favor of the order of 
nature. Rule VIII offers a similar claim--that the exami-
nation of the simple natures is a consideration of things 
only insofar as they are in the understanding. 2 In Rule 
XII he notes that the simplicity of any singularly existing 
substance is altogether different from simplicity in the 
order of thought.3 His message is clear: the simplicity on 
which certain knowledge depends is a feature of the way we 
understand the world rather than of the way the world 
exists independently of our understanding. He seems, there-
fore, to be claiming that there is something mental about 
the simple natures. 
LeBlond regards the distinction bet1-veen the tv10 or-
ders as crucial for the determination of the ontological 
status of the simple natures: 
Notons tout d'abord qu'il ne s'agit pas de "choses" 
mais de "notionstt: Descartes a soin de prtfciser, en 
COmmenyant Cette etude deSAObjets de la COnnaissance, 
qu'il ne s'occupe pas des etres "prout revera exis-
tunt," mais seulement "in ordine ad cognitionem 
nos-E'ram. n4 
1AT X, Rule VI, 3817-16• 
2AT X, Rule VIII, 3995-6 • 
3AT X, Rule XII, 418l-l5. 
4LeBlond, p. 165. 
---
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So far, what LeBlond says seems supported, both by the text 
he cites and by the texts I have cited above; Descartes him-
self has told us that the simplicity with which he is con-
cerned is not the simplicity or unity that any existing 
substance has. It is therefore not an issue of simple 
things.5 LeBlond quite safely uses the more non-committal 
term "notions." However, he then commits himself to some-
thing further; '\'/hen he says "notions" he means "ideas": 
Des le premier pas, done, notions et choses sont 
separees: certes Descartes ne doute nullement que 
les choses ne repondent aux idees; mais enfin, des 
l'abord, il laisse de c~te la relation de lacon-
naissance aux choses.6 
Thus, he arrives at the conclusion that the simple natures 
are .l.deas: "l'inventaire des natures simples est presente, 
non com.rne un examen des choses, mais seulement des idees."? 
LeBlond's claim is that because Descartes is not discussing 
the simplicity of substances, he must therefore be discuss-
ing the simplicity of ideas. This he believes to be the 
significance of the distinction bet1.1een the order of under-
5we should not presume any ontological significance 
when Descartes describes the simple natures as "res" (AT X, 
Rule VI, 381). A res may indeed be a subsisting entity; 
but it can also be-a-mode, a disposition, a distinction, a 
law, an idea, etc. It has the same ambiguous all-purpose 
usage as the English "thing." Haldane and Ross translate 
"res simplicissimae" as "what is quite simple," thereby 
preserving the Cartesian ambiguity. See James Collins, 
Descartes• Philosophy of Nature (London: Blackwell's, 1971), 
Po 12. 
6LeBlond, p. 165. 
?LeBlond, p. 172. 
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standing and the order of nature. What is important here 
is whether the distinction that Descartes makes between 
thought and nature requires that \'/hat is simple be the 
thinker's m1n ideas. 
S. v. Keeling has pointed out a gap in the type of 
argument proposed by LeBlond: although the process of anal-
ysis is assuredly mental, this by no means insures that the 
end-point of analysis (the simple nature) is similarly men-
tal.8 I will show later9 that there is some reason to be-
lieve that the product of analysis is not merely the think-
er's own idea, that Descartes, rather, believes it to have 
some sort of an objective status. Presently, though, the 
mental or extra-mental character of what is directly known 
is still open to question. 
Though Keeling merely points out the gap in LeBlond's 
argument, Brian O'Neil has a more substantive point to make. 
He shO\'IS that the Scholastic realist tradition in \-Thich 
Descartes was educated did not regard the thought-nature 
distinction as requiring a theory of representative ideas.10 
Realists ordinarily drew such a distinction vrhile still 
8
see S. v. Keeling, "Le r~alisme de Descartes et le 
r8le des natures simples," p. 77. "C'est le processus 
d'analyse seul qui est mental et nonce qu'il atteint ou 
decouvre. La subjectivit~ du processus n'entraine aucune-
ment la SUbjectivite de Ce qui est revele'. II 
9see Chapter IV. 
lOO'Neil, pp. 177-178. 
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maintaining the directness of their realism. It is true, 
as we saw above, that Descartes distinguishes his position 
from that (those?) of the Scholastics. His point, though, 
was that the Scholastics proceeded to develop knowledge 
through the syllogism rather than through the method of 
analysis and synthesis. His rejection of Scholasticism is, 
at least in this passage, not a blanket one. It is entirely 
possible, then, that he could share the Scholastic tenet 
that the ability to mentally divide what is known does not 
necessitate that v1hat is kno\m be itself mental. 
Realists, as well as other epistemologists, must 
.find some v1ay of accounting for the fact that v-1e can and do 
separate mentally \'lhat does not actually exist separately. 
A theory that attempts to account for this is a doctrine of 
abstraction. It is essentially such a doctrine of abstrac-
tion that permits Descartes to divide (analyze) mentally 
that which he acknowledges as being connected and even 
necessarily connected extra-mentally. 11 Within the Schol-
astic tradition, the possibility of abstraction did not 
indicate at all to philosophers that their knowledge of 
reality was anything less than direct or immediate. Aquinas 
saw the necessity of acknowledging an order of thought dis-
tinct from the order of reality: 
11 rn the Regulae Descartes reserves the term "ab-
straction" for those attempts to further analyze what is 
already simple. See above, pp. 5-6. He seems later to 
abandon such a restrictive usage. See the letter to Gi-
bieuf, January 19, 1642. 
For it is quite true that the mode of understand-
ing, in the one 1-1ho understands, is not the same 
as the mode of a thing in being; since the thing 
understood is immaterially in the one who under-
stands, according to the mode of the intellect, 
and not materially according to the mode of a 
material thing ••• 12 
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Similar statements can be found in many of the Scholastics. 
See, for example, the Summa Fhilosophica Quadrepartita of 
Eustace of St. Pau+, one of the standard textbooks of the 
seventeenth century. 13 
Indeed, the notion that thought differs from nature 
must be regarded as ordinary and common-sensical; yet, at 
the time of Descartes, it was not generally believed that 
it required a theory of representative ideas. O'Neil has 
expressed it we~l: 
The distinction between thought and nature. • • 
says nothing more than the well known Scholastic 
axiom: "The thing knmvn is in the mind of the knm-rer 
after the fashion of the knower." This does not 
interpose a veil or deny directness and accuracy 
of understanding. It merely says that the process 
of understanding is sui generis and will, in conse-
quence, somewhat rearrange the elements of the 
world in the process of grasping them.l4 
12summa Theologica, Part I, qu. 85, art. 1, cited 
in O'Neil, pp. 1?7-1?8. 
l3Eustachio a Sancto Paulo, Summa Philosophica, IV, 
11-12. This reference is provided by Gilson in his Index 
Scholastico-Cartesien, p. 1. Gilson claims t~at this work 
"resume fidedement • • • 1' enseignement de 1' Ecole" (p. v). 
While it is possible that Descartes did not kno\v of 
this work in his youth, we can be sure that he knew of it 
at least by 1640, when he refers to it as a "typical text-
book." See the letter to I1ersenne, November 11, 1640. 
14
o•Neil, p. 177. 
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This does not establish conclusively that there is 
no doctrine of representative ideas in the Regulae. Nor 
does it establish realism in that work. It does not even 
establish whether a realist can offer an intelligible ac-
count of abstraction. It does show that it was widely held 
at the time of the Regulae that one could make a distinction 
between thought and nature and still maintain the direct-
ness or immediacy of the knowledge of extra-mental reality. 
Unless there is some evidence to the contrary, we have no 
reason to believe that Descartes objected to this assump-
tion. 
It is worth noting that, by the time of the Medita-
tions, when he has openly declared for the doctrine of 
representative ideas, it is not primarily in order to devel-
op a doctrine of abstraction. Instead, he is concerned with 
providing an epistemological framework within which both 
doubt and certainty can be conceptually accounted for. In 
order to do this, he proposed a rather rigid gap between 
thought and world. The gap accounts for doubt and error; 
the arguments of the various meditations will show how to 
bridge the gap and arrive at certainty. 
It might be presumptuous to attribute any such epis-
temological sophistication to the Regulae. Descartes does 
not here seem primarily concerned with such problems. 
It seems, then, that the mere occurrence of a dis-
tinction between thought and nature does not impel us to 
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conclude that Descartes had already opted for a theory of 
representative ideas (or for realism). 
The Simple Natures: Innate Ideas? 
There occur in the Regulae various allusions to the 
inneity of knowledge. If it can be established that Des-
cartes held a doctrine of innate ideas and that these ideas 
are to be identified with the simple natures, then we may 
be able to build a case for the representational interpre-
tation. It would, of course, have to be further established 
that the inneity of these simple natures is inconsistent 
with any claim to the direct knm•Tledge of extra-mental 
reality. 
Jean Laporte has offered such an interpretation of 
the simple natures. He cites, first, Descartes' later con-
tention that those ideas are innate vrhich ttinvolve no af-
firmation or negation. 11l5 The cognition of the simple na-
tures, as we sa\'1 earlier, requires no affirmation or nega-
tion.16 The natures are, therefore, innate. The argument 
relies on the assumption of the continuity of the doctrine, 
an assumption which for purposes of the thesis I do not 
wish to make. Hartland-Swann claims that what is really 
shown by this is that the simple natures of the early 
l5Jean Laporte, Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 84-85. The ci-
tation is from the letter to Hersenne, July 22, 1641. 
16see Chapter 2. 
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philosophy become the innate ideas of the later philoso-
phy.l7 
LeBlond claims the inneity of at least some of the 
simple natures exclusively on the evidence of the Regglae. 
As \ve have already seen, LeBlond claims that the simple 
natures are representative ideas. He believes that at 
least the first group should also be considered innate, 
because of Descartes' claim that they are known "by an in-
born light."18 He is reluctant to include the natures of 
the second group as innate, because Descartes claims that 
experience (the use of the imagination) is essential for 
their perception. Hartland-Swann points out the same dif-
ficulty.19 Their reluctance in this respect seems unwar-
ranted. It has not been established that extra-mental in-
put, if indeed that is what the imagination provides, would 
necessarily be inconsistent with a doctrine of representa-
tive and innate ideas. This will be discussed in a later 
chapter. For nmv, let us assume that the restriction of 
inneity to the first group is unwarranted. If LeBlond has 
a case, it \vill be applicable to all the simple natures. 
17John Hartland-Swann, "Descartes' Simple Natures," 
Philosophy, XXII (1947), 139-142. He finds at least a par-
tial correspondence of the simple natures with the later 
innate ideas but concludes that the natures do not "fit 
unambiguously into the epistemology and ontology of the 
Meditations and Principles." 
18 LeBlond, p. 168, n. 2. 
19Hartland-Swann, p. 141. 
34-
This is supported by the fact that the "natural light" to 
which he refers is the condition for the intuition of any 
of the simple natures. 20 
The supporting text that LeBlond cites is the fol-
1 owing: ". • • we must note that there are but few pure and 
simple natures which either our experiences or some sort of 
1 ight innate in us enable us to intuit • • • "21 If the doc-
trine of inneity expressed herein is to support the repre-
sentational interpretation, the inneity must be of such a 
sort to support the claim that the immediate object of know-
ledge is itself mental (rather than extra-mental)and that 
. t . h . b 22 ~ ~s some ow ~n orn. 
It is significant that in the passage that LeBlond 
cites Descartes is not claiming that the immediate object 
o:f knm"Yledge is innate. \-/hat is innate is the "light" '\"lhich 
enables us to intuit the simple nature. This does not 
establish the sort of inneity that is needed to conclude 
that the simple natures are ideas; it says merely that we 
have an innate capacity for understanding these natures. 
20see Chapter 2, where I discuss the claim that the 
:first group of natures are known by a natural light. 
21AT X, Rule VI, 383ll-l4-. 
22 I use "inborn" '\'iith some hesitation, because in-
natists do not, as a rule, regard the neo-nate as mentally 
cognizant of those ideas that are claimed to be innate. It 
would be more proper to regard such ideas as belonging to 
the mind solely in virtue of its existence as a rational 
mind. Ordinarily, being born is the preface to one's exis-
tence as a rational mind; hence, innate ideas are said to 
be "inborn." See the letter to Hyperaspistes, August, 164-l. 
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This is consistent with other references to inneity that 
occur in the Regulae. In Rule X Descartes speaks of an 
11 inborn faculty of invention" that becomes articulated as 
the rules of method. 23 In Rule I he states that the culti-
vation of this sane method is itself the cultivation of the 
lumen naturale. 24 The thrust of these passages is that we 
have a natural capacity for using that method which will 
enable us to "see" the truth of things. The visual metaphor 
is appropriate for the description of intuition; it further 
explains the light metaphor. What is innate, then, is the 
natural capacity for understanding the natures through the 
use of method. This is similar to Descartes' later doctrine 
of inneity, as expressed by Kenny: 
No matter what X may be, the idea of X is innate 
in the sense that the capacity to think of X, 
imagine X, feel X, experience X is inborn in us 
and is not given us by the stimulus that on a par- 25 ticular occasion makes us think of or experience x. 
There is, therefore, evidence for a doctrine of in-
neity in at least this minimal sense. The passage LeBlond 
cites invokes this minimal sense of inneity. It is not 
sufficient, however, for the establishment of a doctrine of 
innate ideas that would lead necessarily to representation-
alism. The claim for an innate capacity of understanding 
23AT X, Rule X, 40319. 
24AT X, Rule I, 36118• 
-25 Anthony Kenny, Descartes: a Study of his Philos-
£PhY (Nei'l York: Random House, 1968), p. 104. 
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does not assert the kind of inneity that restricts direct 
knowledge to a knowledge of one's own mind. It says merely 
that knovlledge of any sort presumes an innate capacity for 
that sort of knowledge. 
That this is inneity in a sense so minimal that it 
does not distinguish innatists from other epistemologists 
is a rather troubling possibility. That there is no know-
ledge without a capacity for knmving seems a rather trivial 
claim--one that should be acceptable to all but the skeptic. 
Perhaps the claim becomes something more than trivial when 
lve recognize that Descartes regarded the various intellec-
tual capacities as being an explicit product of an inten-
tional design by a creator. That these capacities are 
matched to the way the world exists is part of the miracle 
of creation, a manifestation of the creator's goodness, and 
a necessity if there is to be any knorlledge of the extra-
mental world. 
In conclusion, we have seen that the only sense in 
which Descartes can be said to have explicitly committed 
himself to a theory of innate ideas seems compatible with 
realism as lvell as with the representative theory. Ve 
have seen also that the distinction between the order of 
understanding and the order of nature does not provide suf-
ficient evidence for concluding that the simple natures are 
essentially ideas. These are the two major arguments I have 
found for the representative interpretation. Neither has 
been found to be conclusive. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SIMPLE NATURES AS EXTRA-T·1ENTAL EXISTENTS 
In the last chapter, textual grounds for the repre-
sentational interpretation were examined and found insuffi-
cient. The present chapter will conduct a similar examina-
tion of the grounds for the realist interpretation and will 
arrive at similarly negative conclusions. To make a case 
for the realist interpretation, it is not sufficient to 
establish that, if \..re knmv the simple natures, we necessar-
ily know the nature of extra-mental reality. Such a claim 
would indeed be true of a realist interpretation of simple 
natures, but it could also be true of any doctrine of 
representative ideas that does not lapse into solipsism. 
A realist interpretation must shmv also that the simple 
natures do not just represent the extra-mental world but 
that the;y are actually constitutive of it, that they are 
"ontal elements."1 
This chapter is composed of four sections. In the 
first, I \vill examine two arguments offered by O'Neil. 
These will be shmvn to have been based on remarks taken 
out of context by him and misinterpreted. In the second, 
I will examine the relevance of sense experience to the 
1The term is employed by Keeling. See his Descartes 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 236, n. 1. 
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claim for realism. This will be dealt with specifically 
by an analysis of the role of imagination in knowledge. 
In the third, I will examine the claim that the simple 
natures are somehow "objective." While there is good rea-
son for accepting this claim, I show that the objectivity 
of the natures does not demand the realist interpretation. 
In the fourth, I will look at Keeling's claim that, because 
the simple natures cannot be universals, they must be par-
ticulars and, so, must exist in nature. 
Two Short Arguments 
In this section I will examine two short arguments 
for a realism of simple natures. Both of the arguments 
have been proposed by O'Neil. I have chosen to group them 
together because they are short, because their author is 
the same, and because they both misinterpret remarks made 
by Descartes in a discussion of occult qualities. 
In Rules XII and XIV Descartes, as an example of 
the application of his method, cites the search for the 
simple natures that are involved in a magnet. lie says that 
nthere can be nothing to know in the magnet which does not 
consist in certain simple natures evident in themselves."2 
By proceeding methodically in the examination, one can 
feel confident that "he has discovered the real nature of 
2AT X, Rule XII, 42716- 19. 
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the magnet insofar as it can be discovered by human intelli-
gence with the data of experience."3 Descartes cites the 
example of the magnet as an instantiation of his claim that 
"the whole of human knowledge consists in a distinct per-
ception of the way in which those simple natures combine in 
the composition of other objects."4 If' 1r1e remember this, 
we will avoid the error of hoping to discover something new 
and occult in the magnet.5 Descartes' intention, then, in 
the discussion of the magnet is to warn us that there is 
nothing occult here; everything about the magnet that we 
can know is the combination of simple natures and is dis-
coverable through the method. 
O'Neil believes that the passage has another signi-
:ficance: "Certainly the factors \vhich make a magnet behave 
the v1ay it does are not ideas in our head. n6 The remark is 
somewhat elliptical. I believe that the follo·w·ing amplifi-
cation remains true to O'Neil's intent: Descartes is claim-
ing that to know the simple natures involved is to know the 
:factors that make a magnet behave the way it does. Ideas 
are not \vhat make the magnet so behave. Therefore, the sim-
ple natures are not ideas. 
3AT X, Rule XII, 42725-26 • 
4AT X, Rule XII, 4273- 6 • 
5AT X, Rule XIV. Such ne\v discoveries would be 
possible only in the case of a divine intellect or with the 
acquisition of some new sense. 
6
o•Neil, p. 169. 
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What O'Neil neglects to consider is this: to claim 
that in knovring the simple natures involved we thereby 
understand the behavior of a magnet does not necessarily 
commit Descartes to the claim that the simple natures are 
what make a magnet behave in its characteristic way. As 
stated at the beginning of this chapter, the realist inter-
pretation must establish more than that if we know the sim-
ple natures, 1.ve know \vhat extra-mental reality must be like. 
It must be further established that these natures are con-
stitutive of extra-mental reality. O'Neil has found Des-
cartes claiming that, in knowing certain simple natures, \ve 
know the essential nature of the magnet. Descartes does 
indeed say that much, but that is not enough to establish 
realism. Descartes, in the passage in question, is best 
read as merely claiming that the method, with the knowledge 
of simple natures that it provides, should be considered 
adequate for the knowledge of all that is knmvable. It is 
a mistake to read into the passage any claim about the on-
tological status of the simple natures. 
O'Neil presents a second argument that purports to 
establish the extra-mental existence of at least the mater-
ial simple natures.? Extension, Descartes has said, is it-
self a simple nature.8 In Rule XIV he makes several other 
statements about extension: "By extension we understand 
7o'Neil, p. 170. 
8AT X, Rule XII, 41919. 
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whatever has length, breadth, and depth, not inquiring lvhe-
ther it be real body or merely space u9 • • • "Hence we 
announce that by extension ioJe do not here mean anything 
distinct and separate from the extended object itself ••• "10 
O'Neil merely presents these texts and immediately con-
eludes: "I think the conclusion is unavoidable that some 
simple natures have a species of ontological independence, 
and are constituent of the world.n11 He presents no argu-
ment for this conclusion, but we can surmise vlhat the argu-
ment might be: 
The extended object is extra-mentally existent. 
Extension is not separable from the extra-mental 
object. 
Extension, then, is extra-mentally existent. 
Extension is a simple nature. 
Therefore, this simple nature is extra-mentally 
existent. 
The simple natures are knovm directly. 
Therefore, to know this simple nature is to know 
directly an extra-mental existent. 
If the argument is correct, it must follow that Descartes 
is a realist, at least in the case of knovrledge of material 
objects. 
What O'Neil fails to note is the context of Des-
cartes' remarks. Descartes is attempting to shmv that care-
ful use of the method liill rectify what he regards as "ill-
conceived principles.n One such principle is that space is 
9AT X, Rule XIV, 442l?-l9. 
10AT X, Rule XIV, 44225-26 o 
11o•N "1 1?0 re1. , p. • 
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something distinct from extended objects. He claims that 
space is not anything different from real bodies. It is 
not some occult entity that will still exist even in the 
absence of all extended being; space is not some container 
for the world. This discussion occurs in the very passage 
from which O'Neil quotes. If, when we say "extension" we 
mean "space," we are not really referring to anything but 
the extended object, because "• •• we make it a rule not 
to recognize those metaphysical entities that cannot really 
b t d . th . . t. 1112 e presen e 1n e 1mag1na 1on. This is a position 
that he continued to maintain through the later philoso-
phy.l3 
O'Neil interprets Descartes as saying that exten-
sion as a simple nature is not in any way different from 
the extended body. On this rests his claim to realism in 
the knowledge of this nature. All that Descartes is actu-
ally claiming here is that space is not empty, that there 
can be no such thing as a vacuum. O'Neil's interpretation 
is textually unsupported; the passage makes no claims about 
the ontological status of the simple nature extension. 
12AT X, Rule XIV, 44226- 29. 
l3see Principles, II, X; Descartes to Mersenne, 
January 9, 1639; Descartes to Chanut, June 6, 1647. Most 
important, though, are the text of Rule XIV and the letter 
to Mersenne of April 15, 1630, which indicates that Des-
cartes was already claiming that he could prove the impos-
sibility of a vacuum. 
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The Argument from the Role of the Imagination 
Descartes says that the imagination has a role to 
play in the perception of the simple natures of both the 
second and third groups, namely, those that are material 
and those that may be either material or spiritual with no 
change in meaning. All sensory input from the extra-mental 
world is channelled ultimately through the imagination. 
Thus, it might appear that, in claiming a role for the 
imagination, Descartes is affirming the necessity of a cog-
nitive contact with the extra-mental world for the percep-
tion of the second and third groups of natures. To deter-
mine whether this contact with the extra-mental world 
necessitates a realist interpretation, \'le must examine 
what the imagination is for Descartes and make more speci-
fie its role in knowledge. That is the project of this 
section. It will ultimately be shovvn that, \-Thile the imag-
ination has a role to play in the perception of these na-
tures, that role is not of a sort to necessitate the real-
ist interpretation. Moreover, it provides evidence for the 
impossibility of the realist interpretation. 
Kemp Smith has postulated a realism on the above 
basis: 
In the Regulae there is • • • no doctrine of innate 
ideas and no doctrine of representative perception--
none at least, of the type which postulates that phy-
sical entities can be known only by way of mental 
duplicates.l4 
14Norman Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy 
of Descartes (New York: Russell and Russell, 1966), p. 51. 
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In the case of those simple natu~es that can be in material 
objects (i.e., those of the second and third groups), the 
realism is supported thus: 
The self, which in its earthbound life is an em-
bodied self, is • • • irnmedia tely aware of the 
physical patterns which external objects, by way 
of their action on the bodily sense-organs, imprint 
on the brain.l5 
Smith cites no specific texts in support of this interpreta-
tion. What we must establish is whether this immediate 
awareness of patterns of physical objects is the same thing 
as thepereepticn ofas:inple nature and, if not, '\'lhat its rela-
tion is to the perception of simple natures. This is essen-
tially the problem of the relation of understanding to imag-
ination. 
The Cartesian discussion of the imagination in the 
Regulae takes two divergent directions, which must both be 
accounted for. Ch.tre me !and, we find Descartes insisting 
that we be wary of the entrapments of a misplaced confidence 
in sense experience. In the acquisition of certain know-
ledge, we must rely only on intuition and deduction (which 
. •t lf . 1 . t •t• ) 16 Int •t• h •t . ~s ~ se a ser~a ~n u~ ~on • u1. 1.on, e \vrl. es, 1.s 
"not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the mis-
leading judgment that proceeds from the blundering construc-
tions of the imagination ••• "17 This might lead us to 
believe that sense experience and imagination have absolutely 
15~.' p. 52. 
16AT X, Rule IX, 40o16-l9. 
l7AT X, Rule III, 36814- 16• 
no role in knowledge. 
On the other hand, Descartes decries those philos-
ophers who, "• •• neglecting experience, imagine that 
truth will spring from their brain like Pallas from the 
head of 18 Zeus." This would make us suspect that the 
imagination will be relevant to the acquisition of know-
ledge. The discussion of simple natures in Rule XII reaf-
firms this role of the imagination al\'lays and necessarily 
in the perception of the second group of simple natures and 
always but not necessarily in the perception of the third 
group. 19 Whether this role commands the direct realist 
interpretation is the matter under discussion. 
Initially, ,,.re must clarify exactly what the imag-
ination is for Descartes. Although the Regulae says that 
it is actually a physical organ that takes on the shape of 
the object perceived, 20 it soon becomes clear that the role 
that he accords to the imagination is not explicable in 
purely physical terms. He seems often to regard the imag-
ination as the awareness of the shapes taken on by the phys-
ical organ. Some years later, he admits in the correspond-
ence to using the term in both senses. 21 The active knowing 
18AT X, Rule XII, 41915-25. Note that even if it 
can be established that the role of the imagination requires 
a direct realism, this would hold true only of the second 
group. The first group would not be affected, and the sta-
tus of the third group would remain ambiguous. 
l9AT X, Rule V, 38014- 16 Q 
20AT X, Rule XII, 414l9-24• 
21Descartes to I1ersenne, April 21, 1641. 
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power (vis cognoscens) sometimes along with the imagination 
is applied to the sensus communis; in this case we are said 
to sense. 22 But this is not the role of the imagination 
that interests us, for Descartes never equates sensing with 
knowing. Kemp Smith seems oblivious to this point; his 
interpretation does not draw the distinction. 
We are properly said to understand, Descartes 
claims, only \'Then the vjs cognoscens operates alone. This 
is a rather strange claim for Descartes, for in the very 
next paragraph he asserts that the "understanding can be 
moved by the imagination."23 He goes on to claim that 
II 
• • • if the understanding proposes to examine something 
that can refer to a body, we must form the idea of that 
th . d. t. tl .bl . th . . t. u24 lng as ls lnc y as possl e ln e lmag1na lon. 
This is what is again proposed in the cases of the second 
and third groups of simple natures. \fuat exactly is Des-
cartes proposing? Is he claiming that the consciousness of 
the image is itself certain knmvledge? If so, then he 
might be a direct realist. I say "might," for it '"~ould 
have to be further established that the imagination, or 
better, the image imagined was a faithful representation of 
extra-mental reality. Descartes, though, warns us against 
such a presumption. The i"'is e man 
22AT X, Rule XII, 4-1527-4-161 • 
23AT X, Rule XII, 4-16170 
24AT X, Rule XII, 4-1628_4-171. 
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• • • \vill judge that \vhatever comes to him from 
his imagination is really depicted in it, but yet 
will never assert that the object has passed com-
plete and without any alteration from the external 
world to his senses and from his senses to his 
imagination • • • 25 
A direct realist would have to assume prima facie the faith-
fulness of this passing, and Descartes does not. If we re-
gard the imagination, then, as not having any certain and 
direct connection with extra-mental reality, it would become 
quite difficult to maintain that, because the imagination 
serves the understanding, the understanding thereby has a 
direct contact vlith extra-mental reality. 
Moreover, even if v1e could presume that the world 
was faithfully reproduced in our imagination, we would 
still have to ascertain the nature of the relation between 
imagination and understanding. Descartes would be a real-
ist only if this relation was of a sort to preserve the 
directness of knowledge. He says that the understanding 
b d ( . . t) b th . . t . 26 In R 1 can e move moverl possl y e lmaglna lOn. u e 
XIV he affirms that a question about extension (meaning 
about any of the second group of natures) "• •• must be 
set before the imagination ••• , for this is the best 
way to make it clear to the understanding.n27 Somewhat 
later in the same rule, he tells us that it is possible 
25AT X, Rule XII, 42313-20. 
26AT X, Rule XII, 41617. 
27AT X, Rule XIV, 43810-11. 
and 
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even necessary to use the imagination as an aid (imagina-
!1onis adjument~). 28 For, he tells us, by fixing an image 
in the imagination we will insure that we do not imprudently 
exclude some nature that belongs to it. This is similar to 
the claim in Rule XII that, while the understanding alone 
is capable of perceiving truth, it ought nevertheless to be 
aided by the imagination. 29 
In summary, there are two distinct occurrences when 
a simple nature is understood with the aid of the imagina-
tion. First, there is consciousness of an image. Second, 
there is an understanding of the nature(s) which the image 
instantiates. The two should not be confused; the occur-
rence of a mental image is not itself understanding of the 
natures instantiated in that image. This explains Des-
cartes' warning against dependence on the imagination. 
\~at needs to be established is the relation be-
tween the two occurrences. Having a mental picture before 
us seems to insure that we will omit nothing relevant and 
will not count as a material nature something unimaginable. 
To claim that something is material and yet in principle 
unimaginable is, according to Descartes, a contradiction. 
The constant use of the imagination as an aid to understand-
ing will prevent such errors as pretending to understand 
empty space. 
28AT X, Rule XIV, 44516- 23. 
29AT X, Rule XII, 41017-23. 
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Any attempt to construe this as realism must deal 
with a difficulty that Kemp Smith has not acknowledged. As 
we discussed earlier, we must account for the Cartesian 
claim that certain knowledge is possible only when we refrain 
from judging that our mental images pass from the world dir-
ectly, i.e., -vlithout alteration. This indicates that we 
cannot count on being in immediate cognitive contact v.fith 
the extra-mental world, and the search for knowledge ought 
not to proceed under the assumption that we are. This poses 
a major problem for the realist interpretation. In addi-
tion, when the actual role of the imagination is made ex-
plicit, we find that it by no means presumes contact '\·lith 
the extra-mental. It serves as a useful picture in the mind, 
a mental picture of an instance of what we are trying to 
understand. The understanding does not abstract from the 
mental picture, but Descartes presumes that we can neverthe-
less compare our understanding of nature x with an imaginary 
picture of some object incorporating ~· The imagination pro-
vides a psychological help for directing attention, but 
kno-vrledge is not in any way extracted from it. Thus, even 
if it could be established that the imagination faithfully 
pictures the extra-mental world, the way in \-Thich the under-
standing makes use of the imagination again precludes di-
rectness .of knm'lledge. \>lith such a lack of direct cognitive 
contact \vith an extra-mental world, I doubt that a case 
could be made for realism on the grounds of what Descartes 
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says about the imagination in the Regulae. 
The Argument from the Objectivity of the Simple Natures 
There are numerous considerations that indicate that 
Descartes regarded the simple natures as having a sort of 
objective status. By "objective," I mean that their real-
ity and place in knowledge is not merely that conferred upon 
them by the knower. The simple natures would be what they 
are regardless of the thinking processes of any given think-
er. One way of accounting for this objective status would 
be to interpre.t the natures as 11 ontal elements 11 of extra-
mental reality. I will examine the reasons for claiming 
this objective status and will show that there is a much 
more plausible basis for it than the realist interpretation 
offers. Let us first examine the reasons for claiming the 
objective status of the simple natures. 
As evidence, no~first of all that the criteria of 
clarity and distinctness, with which the natures are known, 
are put forth as logical criteria. One may object (with 
Leibniz) that these criteria end up being psychological. 
That may be true, but it is still true that Descartes in-
tended them to be logical.30 It is not by choice or by the 
whim of the thinker that some perceptions are clear and 
distinct while others are not. Some perceptions can be had 
30Alan Gewirtz, 11 Clearness and Distinctness in Des-
cartes," Philosoph;r, 18:1943, 17-36. 
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clearly and distinctly and others cannot; the content of 
the perception (as well as the methodical approach of the 
perceiver) guarantees this. I have shown earlier that the 
simplicity of the nature apprehended guarantees the clarity 
and distinctness of its apprehension. This simplicity is 
not a property of the perceiver as subject; some perceptions 
are simple and they can only be perceived as simple. There 
is something about them that imposes itself on the thinker. 
What can be perceived as simple and what can be perceived 
clearly and distinctly are determined, not exclusively by 
the thinker, but by the nature of what is thought. 
Second, there are real distinctions among the simple 
natures; each is different from the others and necessarily 
so. Keeling states that "• •• chacune a son caract~re 
unique et homog~ne qui la distingue de toute autre. Cette 
distinction n'est pas rationis mais realis • • • This 
guaranteed heterogeneity is due to the .fact that, if tv10 na-
tures were not different (in content) .from each other, they 
would be only one nature. Each nature is perceived as dis-
tinct .from all others. The distinctness is grounded in the 
nature itself, not in the thinker. 
Third, Descartes himself claims that the simple na-
tures have an objective status. This claim occurs in one 
o.f the .few references to simple natures after the Regulae. 
3lKeeling, "Le realisme de Descartes et le r~le des 
natures simples," p. 78. 
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Descartes is discussing another theory of common notions, 
that of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Cherbury had claimed that 
universal assent was the criterion of indubitable common 
notions.32 Descar·bes rejects this; his own common notions 
(a subset of the third group of simple natures) may be uni-
versally assented to, but that is not why they are indubi-
table. Universalized assent is merely generalized subjec-
tivity. Descartes claims that there needs to be an objec-
tive foundation for this universalized assent: 
••• I have no criteria for ••• [the common no-
tions as truths] except the light of nature. The 
two criteria (universal assent and the light of 
nature] agree in part; for since all men have the 
same natural light~ it seems they should have the 
same notions ••• 3~ 
This natural light is, of course, the light of reason. It 
is not merely the fact that all rational men assent to the 
common notions that makes them indubitably true; more 
important is the claim that it is rational to assent to 
them. They seem, therefore, to be objectively grounded in 
some way, so that it would be not merely exceptional but 
irrational to refuse to assent to them. 
Fourth, as I remarked earlier, the knowledge of 
the simple natures is characterized as both true and cer-
tain. There must be some sort of objective foundation for 
truth, or the term is meaningless. This objective founda-
tion must enable us to account for both truth and falsity. 
32Lord Edward Herbert of Cherbury, De Veritate. 
33Descartes to Mersenne, October 16, 1639o 
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Moreover, all knowledge must be about something. The sim-
ple natures are objects of knowledge. 
It seems necessary, therefore, to attribute some 
sort of objective status to the simple natures. If they 
could be regarded as "ontal elements," their objectivity 
would indeed be established. A correspondence theory of 
truth could then be developed, resting on the claim that 
the natures, as extra-mental, must be objective. If there 
is another plausible account, though, which also establish-
es the objectivity of the natures and is based on the texts, 
then we have no reason for preferring the realist interpre-
tation. I believe that there is such an alternative ac-
count, explicit in the later philosophy and at least sem-
inal in the Regulae. Let us examine it. 
In the Meditations Descartes states that 11 ••• 
every clear and distinct perception is without doubt some-
thing and hence cannot derive its origin from what is 
nought ••• 1134 The same indication that clear and dis-
tinct truths are themselves something real seems to be 
implicit in Meditation I. \.Je may regard certain eternal 
truths (e.g., the truths of mathematics and geometry) as 
still true even if we doubt the existence of an extra-
mental world. In such a case, the truths expressed in 
these propositions, would not be founded in the physical 
world. Descartes wants to maintain that such truths are 
34Meditation IV. 
54 
not founded in the 1-vorld, but in something else. 
In 1630 (less than a year after the estimated date 
of the Regulae), Descartes goes so far as to maintain that 
such eternal truths or essences have a reality of their 
own both as God's ideas and as what must be true of any 
world.35 In fact, it seems plausible to regard the simple 
natures as themselves having their foundation in the deity, 
as any essence must be expressed in terms of these simple 
natures. To establish the case for this more definitively, 
it would have to be shown that the same things (or types of 
things) that Descartes called eternal essences must be col-
lections of inter-related natures. I am confident that this 
could be done, although it is beyond the scope of this the-
sis. Thus grounding the simple natures in the deity \vould 
enable us to establish the objectivity needed to character-
ize the knowledge of the simple natures as true and as de-
pendent on the light of reason. It would also provide a 
context for the rather opaque statement about the quasi-
divine character of the human intellect: "· •• The human 
mind has in it something we may call divine, wherein are 
scattered the first germs of useful modes of thought."36 
If we should ultimately find this interpretation 
acceptable, how will it affect the status of the simple 
natures? It would indicate that the realist interpretation 
35Descartes to f'lersenne, J.VIay 6 and 27, 1630. See 
also Meditation V. 
36AT X, Rule IV, 3737- 9• 
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is not the only way of accounting for the objectivity of the 
simple natures. It does not, though, provide a move defin-
itive statement of what the epistemology of the Regulae 
actually is. Certain p.ertinent questions are still left 
unanswered. First, we have no positive statement about 
the relation of our ideas to God's ideas. Do our ideas 
"represent" God's ideas? If so, then the representative 
theory would be the appropriate interpretation. The repre-
sentativeness would then be double: our ideas would repre-
sent God's ideas which, in turn, would represent extra-
mental reality. If, instead, we know the divine ideas 
directly, we will have a direct knmvledge of something extra-
mentally real, inasmuch as God's ideas have a reality not 
dependent on our thought. But this would not be a direct 
knowledge of something extra-mentally existent; it would, 
therefore, not constitute a realism as we have understood 
it in this thesis. 
Second, there is no indication whether the term 
"simple natures" refers to our ideas, to God's ideas, or 
to both indifferently. This makes it impossible to estab-
1 ish what we are claiming to knm;r most directly and immedi-
ately v1hen \ve know the simple natures. It seems that, 
even under this alternative explanation of the objectivity 
of the simple natures, we are still not able to give a 
definitive characterization of the epistemology of the 
Regulae. It has been shmvn, though, that the realist 
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interpretation is not the only explanation for the objec-
tive status of the simple natures and not even the most 
plausible one. 
The Simple Natures and Universals 
Keeling, in support of the realist interpretation, 
argues that the simple natures cannot be interpreted in the 
representational frame1.vork. The representational interpre-
tation would require viewing the natures as universals or 
concepts that would represent various individuals. This, 
he argues, is inconsistent with what Descartes says about 
the simple natures: 
• • • Les concepts sont des abstractions ayant com-
pr~ension et extension, done essentiellement des 
idees qui sont applicables aux choses. I1ais les 
natures simples n'ont hi compr~hension ni extension. 
On ne peut pas dire qu'on les applique a quelque 
chose; on les decouvre tout simplement et on les 
connait pour ce qu'elles sont.37 
Keeling cites no text from the Regulae in support of his 
claim.38 He assumes that the simple natures will be either 
universals or extra-mentally existing singulars. Let us 
not question this assumption of the basic epistemological 
framework, though he offers no foundation for it. Instead, 
let us see why he refuses to characterize the simple natures 
37Keeling, "Le r~alisme de Descartes et le rSle des 
natures simples," p. 78. 
3BMy own reading of the text shows only one obvi-
ous reference to a doctrine of universals in the Regulae. 
Se'e AT X, Rule XIV, 43911-19. This passage is so ambiguous 
that I fail to see in it support for any specific doctrine 
of universals. 
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as universals. 
The natures cannot be universals, he says, because 
they are "quite simply discovered and kno\'m for 1.vhat they 
are." This seems to allude to Descartes' claim that the 
natures are uer se nota. I believe that Keeling has mis-
taken the significance of this claim. In Rule VIII, Des-
cartes distinguishes the simple natures from compounds 
formed by the understanding. 39 The simple natures are 
knmrn in themselves (per se nota) precisely because they 
are not compounded out of and therefore not known in terms 
of anything else. \{.hen Descartes says again in Rule XII 
that they are per se nota, 1.ve find that it is with something 
similar in mind. He says that, because the natures are 
per se nota, they are 1.vholly free from .falsity.40 Either 
you understand one or you don't; as shown in Chapter II, 
nothing in between the t1vo extremes is even intelligible. 
The claim that the simple natures are per se nota is not 
itself a claim that they are never applied in any way to 
singular objects; it is merely a claim that we do not ar~ 
rive at an understanding of the simple natures through an 
understanding of anything else. That the simple natures 
are discovered in themselves has no implications for the 
39 16-19 AT X, Rule VIII, 399 • Here Descartes claims 
that the simple natures are "per se cognitis," but I do 
not believe that he means anything other tlian "per se nota." 
40AT X, Rule XII, 42014- 15. 
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question of whether they are subsequently to be "applied" 
to individual extra-mental existents. For this reason I 
find Keeling's argument unsatisfactory. He needs to estab-
lish that a direct knowledge of the simple natures is in-
consistent with their being "applicable to things." He 
has failed to do so; moreover, he has failed even to no-
tice that he must do so. 
In summary, our discussion of the realist inter-
pretation has failed to establish any conclusive evidence 
for it. All the arguments presented have been shown to 
be either inconclusive or based on a misinterpretation of 
the texts. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The chapters of this thesis have led to very few 
positive conclusions about the status of Cartesian epis-
temology at the time of the Regulae. I have shown that 
the distinction Descartes draws between the order of the 
understanding and the order of nature should not be un-
critically regarded as evidence for the representational 
interpretation. Similarly the various references to in-
neity are inconclusive, and, taken in a minimal sense, 
would be compatible with a realist interpretation. In 
short, I find no conclusive evidence for the representa-
tional interpretation. 
Nor can the realist interpretation be established 
conclusively. We have seen Keeling's argument that the 
natures must be interpreted as parts of extra-mental 
reality because they cannot be universal concepts applied 
or referred to things. His argument was rejected because 
it was not established that the simple natures cannot be 
referred to things. The two short arguments by O'Neil, 
when interpreted in context, were similarly dismissed as 
irrelevant to the issue. The attenpt to establish real-
ism on the basis of some extra-mental input fed through 
the imagination was dismissed. If anything, the role 
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that Descartes accords the imagination establishes a ~ 
of direct contact with the extra-mental world. It seems, 
therefore, to be more amenable to the representational 
interpretation. Again, though, the doctrine is not clear 
enough to be conclusive. 
I feel compelled to conclude that the Regulae 
does not have an epistemology that falls squarely within 
one of the tv10 interpretations under discussion. Descartes 
does not appear to have been conscious of or concerned ·Ni th 
the distinction betv1een direct realism and representation-
alism. Consider all the topics we have discussed: the 
nature of mental abstraction, the nature of inneity, the 
nature of universals, the relation between thought and 
world, and the role of the imagination (and, therefore, of 
sense) in understanding. Each of these is an area in 
which the direct realist and the representationalist would 
propose substantially different theories. We have found, 
though, that Descartes is ambiguous on each of these is-
sues. The ambiguity should not be surprising. Descartes 
is not primarily concerned in the Regulae with the estab-
lishment of an ontologically grounded epistemology. His 
concern is to establish rules for the use of the mind; the 
Regulae is essentially a treatise on method. We should 
not, therefore, expect to find considered responses to the 
questions this thesis has examined. In the Regulae Des-
cartes did not consider the importance of the distinction 
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between direct realism and representationalism. The doc-
trine of the simple natures is best regarded as a somewhat 
naive and superficial account of the various "parts" of 
knowledge, perhaps adequate for considerations of method 
but not an answer to fundamental epistemological issues. 
It is only on a naive level that quantity, relations, prin-
ciples of inference, negations, existence can all be re-
garded as one a par in knowledge, as parts or pieces of 
knowledge. If we seek out a level on which all these can 
be dealt with alike, I believe that level must remain 
rat~ ~erficial. On this level, the question of their 
ontological status does not arise and is therefore not 
resolved. 
The Regulae seek to establish practical rules for 
the acquisition of certain knowledge. It is only later 
that Descartes seriously poses the question of whether 
certain knowledge is even possible. Only \vhen he begins 
to take the device of the methodic doubt seriously, does 
the question of the ontological status of the natures 
(which by then are made complex and called ideas or essen-
ces) come into discussion. Under the doubt, we are forced 
to acknowledge the possibility that all that we formerly 
thought we knew about the world might be merely ideas in 
our mind with no extra-mental referent. This doubt is 
sustained, at least partially, through the first five 
Meditations. While sustaining the doubt, Descartes 
62 
develops his conception of the nature of human conscious-
ness. This must account for the possibility of my ideas 
being nothing more than mental events with a certain repre-
sentational structure. The conception that emerges is of 
consciousness as a container; the intentional aspect of 
consciousness, a requirement for realism, is not consi-
dered. When consciousness is viewed as a container for 
ideas, Descartes commits himself to the doctrine of repre-
sentative ideas. Thus, it is only the concerns of the 
later philosophy that impelled Descartes to assert the 
doctrine of representative ideas. These were not his con-
cerns at the \vriting of the Regulae. 
I find no compelling reasons for not regarding the 
simple natures as a rather undeveloped proto-representa-
tive theory, but the justification for selecting such an 
interpretation could not come from the internal evidence 
of the Regulae. It is, therefore, legitimate to use the 
later doctrine to shed light on the Regulae, but the semi-
nal character of the earlier work should not be overblown 
into a definitive epistemology. 
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